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decide which was the more rational. 67
Without these strong policy considerations, the theory of local control is
arguably as out-dated as the foundation grant theory which gave it life. In
this age of increasing federal aid to education with its attendant assurances
and requirements for participation therein, the theory of local control as a
reality seems to be waning. The majority commended the virtues of local
control, but when these are measured against the effects of the present fi-
nancing system, the principle suffers. To argue that districts still maintain
a large measure of authority to decide how existing funds can be spent is
not the point, for if a district is only able to generate sufficient revenue for
a minimum educational offering, how many different ways can such amount
be allocated and still provide a basically adequate education?
The issue of the constitutionality of state systems for financing education
is not dead, for Rodriguez applied only to challenges under the equal pro-
tection clause of the Federal Constitution. Many state constitutions con-
sider education a fundamental right to be provided to all pupils in the most
equitable way possible. 68 While it remains to be seen whether the state leg-
islatures will voluntarily reform their financing system, there is no longer
any doubt that it is a job solely for them. Likewise, there remains little
question as to the course on which the Court has embarked in its examina-
tion of cases alleging a denial of equal protection, a course steering away
from the strict judicial scrutiny standard back toward the more familiar
grounds of the traditional equal protection review.
Daniel B. Hatzenbuehler
Texas Oil and Gas v. United States: The
Revival of the Choateness Doctrine
A security agreement was executed on March 25, 1967, and perfected' on
March 29, 1967, between Hilton Blackmon and Pecos Bank, by which
Blackmon agreed to factor the accounts receivable of his oil field service
67 The Court refused to enter into the debate which occupied the Mclnnis, Serrano,
and Rodriguez courts, plus a legion of scholars, on what system should replace the
present one; indeed, to have done so would have been inconsistent with the Court's
holding. However, the Court was aware of the debate and acknowledged its existence
as further reason for their refusal to interfere in the area of educational policy and
fiscal affairs. See 411 U.S. at 41 n.85.
68 See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), and Milliken v.
Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), both of which invalidated their school
finance system. Robinson was decided after the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez
and relied solely on the New Jersey Constitution. Sweetwater County Planning Comm'n
for the Organization of School Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), invali-
dated the Wyoming system by relying on the Serrano rationale.
' See Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.401-.408 (1968), dealing with the pro-
cedure required by Texas law in filing and perfecting a security interest. Under Texas
law, a financing statement must be filed before the security interest of the lending
party can fully be perfected. Whenever there is not an outstanding secured obligation
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company as soon as they arose, in consideration of periodic loans from the
bank. In September 1970, Blackmon contracted to perform services for
Texas Oil and Gas Corporation, and as a result of their completion in No-
vember 1970, Texas Oil and Gas owed Blackmon $14,690.10. The United
States had filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Blackmon for defi-
ciencies for federal withholding and FICA taxes in the amount of $5,513.01
in February 1970. Pursuant to this tax lien, the Government caused a Notice
of Levy to be served upon Texas Oil and Gas, seeking to seize the money
held by it and owing to Blackmon. Shortly after the Notice of Levy was
served, Pecos Bank also served notice upon Texas Oil and Gas to pay over to
it, pursuant to its security agreement, the sum due and owing to Blackmon.
In an attempt to avoid double liability, Texas Oil and Gas instituted a rule 22
interpleader action 2 in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas, for determination of the priority of these two competing
claims. The district court declared the federal lien to be superior to that
of the bank and rendered judgment for the Government.3 The Pecos Bank
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Held,
affirmed: A taxpayer's accounts receivable for services rendered are not
"acquired" for purposes of the Federal Tax Lien Act 4 until work is per-
formed, and therefore, one who claims an interest in the accounts receivable
by virtue of a security agreement is not accorded priority over federal tax
liens filed more than forty-five days before the accounts receivable are so
acquired.5 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 446 F.2d 1040 (5th
Cir. 1972).
I. THE GENESIS OF THE INCHOATE LIEN
With the increase of importance of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
priorities which exist between various liens upon a taxpayer's property and
his creditor's security interest are a matter of far-reaching importance and
continuous litigation. A tax lien is a powerful revenue collection device
which serves the dual function of putting pressure on delinquent taxpayers
to discharge their liabilities and preserving the Government's priority as
against claimants to the taxpayer's property.6 It attaches to "all property
and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to" the tax-
payer, 7 including after-acquired property.8  The lien arises secretly and
automatically when the tax is assessed. 9 Any purchasers, holders of a se-
curity interest or mechanic's lienors are protected unless they have either
or a commitment to make future advances, the secured party must, on written demand
by the debtor, send the debtor a termination statement. This statement shows that he
no longer claims a security interest under the financing statement.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
3 Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
4 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125-47.
5 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c).
6 See generally Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The
Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954); Plumb,
The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 11 TAx COUN. Q. 71 (1967).
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
8 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945).
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6322.
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actual or constructive notice of the lien before they acquire their interest.10
Claims by the federal government have priority over those of most other
interest holders by virtue of two statutory provisions. The first of these is
section 3466 of the Revised Statutes" which grants to the Government first
priority as a creditor and is available only in the case of an insolvent debtor
whose property has passed to a third person other than a trustee in bank-
ruptcy.12  The second, section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
makes no mention of priority, creates a lien on "all property" of a delinquent
taxpayer and covers only tax debts that arise, regardless of the solvency of
the taxpayer.13
In its earliest interpretations of section 3466, the Supreme Court held
that federal priority did not overcome an antecedent lien,14 refusing to in-
clude a secret and retroactive lien in the priority statute. The Court soon
departed from this early trend in Spokane County v. United States,15 affirm-
ing the decision of the state supreme court'6 that the federal claim under
section 3466 was superior to a local tax lien. The Court's emphasis on the
fact that the local lien was not perfected to its final degree' 7 inauspiciously
originated the "choateness" doctrine, which was to become the standard for
subsequent competitive actions between federal, state, local, or private
liens.' 8
Though expounding the traditional "first in time, first in right" standard,'9
the Supreme Court severely restricted the doctrine by holding that in order
to be "first in time," the competing lien must first have met three condi-
tions. Unless the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien,
and the amount payable were known and fixed beyond any possibility of
change or substitution, the competing lien was held "inchoate" and thus
inferior to the federal tax lien.20  Once born, the doctrine of the in-
1Od. § 6323(a).
11 RE. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
12 Four situations particularly named in § 3466-the decedent's estate, the voluntary
assignment, the attachment of the property of an absent debtor, and the commission of
an act of bankruptcy-have been held to be exclusive of the situations in which § 3466
operates. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923); United States v. Hooe,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73, 91 (1805). The Supreme Court has inferred that the debtor'sproperty must pass to some other person for the statute to apply. Bramwell v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926).
13 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
14 The Court has repeatedly indicated that such retroactive secret liens greatly dis-
rupted commercial transactions. United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805).
See also Field v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 182 (1835); Conard v. Nicoll, 29
U.S. (4 Pet.) 291 (1830); United States v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F.2d 102, 103
(2d Cir. 1931).
1 279 U.S. 80 (1929).16 Exchange Nat'l Bank v. United States, 147 Wash. 176, 265 P. 722 (1928). Two
counties had assessed taxes against the debtor's personal property both before and
after he went into receivership, at which time the federal tax lien attached. TheSupreme Court of Washington held that no property in the hands of the receiver had
been assessed by the counties until the federal tax lien arose and therefore the federal
claim was superior.
17 279 U.S. at 94-95.
18 See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 913-16.
'9 See United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964); United States v. Pioneer
Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
20 Except for certain liens for state and local taxes and some possessory liens, it
appeared that no statutory lien could qualify until the lienor's claim had been reduced
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choate and general lien was nurtured in subsequent decisions, such as United
States v. Texas,21 until now it has engrossed practically every lien to be found
in modern American law.22  The Court has continued to avoid the unan-
swered question of whether a perfected choate lien is superior to the federal
priority provided under section 3466, for the Court has always been suc-
cessful in finding at least one feature suggestive of inchoateness.
II. PRIORITY OF FEDERAL LIENS
The general tax lien of section 6321 does not specify that the United
States has a first lien or should be paid first, as does section 3466, when the
debtor is insolvent. Early interpretations of section 6321 relied on this
omission of important language as a congressional sanction for the states to
accord the federal tax lien whatever subordinate position they desired.
23
These early interpretations giving state liens priority yielded to federal pri-
ority as the need for a lien to secure the Government's tax claims, regard-
less of the taxpayer's solvency, became apparent with the expansion of fed-
eral fiscal requirements. Section 6321 stipulates that if, after demand for
payment, any person should neglect or refuse to pay a federal tax,24 the
amount of the tax should be a lien in favor of the United States. The lien
attaches to "all property . . . belonging to such person."' 25  The Govern-
ment advanced a plausible theory for superiority of the federal lien under
this section by proposing that the rationale of the cases decided under sec-
tion 3466 should be followed in determining priorities of competing liens
under section 6323.26 This argument by analogy gained few followers until
the Government pressed its rationale against an attaching creditor before
to judgment. Furthermore, even mortgages and other contractual security, despite their
often specially favored position under the federal statutes, were vulnerable to subse-
quently arising federal tax liens to the extent that the security embraced after-acquired
property or involved disbursements later to be made. See, e.g., United States v. Pioneer
Am. Life Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963). See also Rev. Rul. 56-41, 1956-1 CuM. BULL.
562.
21 314 U.S. 480 (1941). A Texas court had held that a lien for state gasoline
taxes on all property used in the business of a gasoline distributor was superior to both
a prior mortgage and a priority claim for federal gasoline taxes. State v. Nix, 138
S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940). The United States Supreme Court
reversed because the competing lien was not sufficiently specific and perfected to
prevail against the federal tax lien. The property subject to the lien was "neither spe-
cific nor constant"; the amount of the claim secured by the lien was "unliquidated and
uncertain"; and no final enforceable judgment had been entered. 314 U.S. at 487.
22 In order to fulfill the expansion of the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien,
the Supreme Court ruled that specificity and perfection of competing liens is a federal
question. United States v. Waddill, Hollard & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
Thus, not only must the competing lien be conclusively definite and perfected, the
standard by which it is so deemed is to be federally determined.
23 in re Mt. Jessup Coal Co., 7 F. Supp. 603 (M.D. Pa. 1934).
24 Neglect or refusal to pay after demand is a condition precedent to the inception
of the federal lien. It seems clear that there is no relation back to cut off rights
vesting in the period intervening between the time of demand and time of refusal to
pay. See Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal
Taxes, 95 U. PA. L. REy. 739, 745 (1947).
25 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
20 Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950); In Re Taylorcraft Aviation
Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948). The Government was unsuccessful in both cases
in its attempt to subordinate competing liens to a federal tax lien.
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the Supreme Court in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank.27
In Security Trust the concept of the general or inchoate lien, originally
evolved under the priority provisions of section 3466, was expanded in tax
lien litigation to test the rights of competing claimants whose claims were
based on events preceding the inception of the competing federal tax lien.
28
The Supreme Court held that the federal lien was superior to the attachment
lien, despite the fact that the tax lien was filed subsequent to the competing
lien's attachment and no insolvency question was presented. Although the
attachment was effective to protect the lienor against others than the Gov-
ernment, it was contingent upon the taking of subsequent steps for enforce-
ment such as judicial foreclosure, and, therefore, was deemed inchoate as to
the federal government. 29
Despite this significant victory, the Government encountered considerable
resistance to its efforts to exploit the implications of Security Trust.30 Disre-
garding the choateness test promulgated by the Supreme Court under sec-
tion 3466, lower courts had little difficulty in finding the doctrine's standards
satisfied by competing liens. The method employed by these lower courts
was to characterize competing liens in such a manner as to place them within
the protection of the notice-filing provision.31 Even in a subsequent Su-
preme Court decision, -32 it seemed that the harsh results of the choateness
doctrine could indeed be mitigated, as the Court for the first time found a
lien to be specific and perfected, and thereby choate and protected from the
federal tax lien. 33 Despite the implications of that holding and its promise
of success for competing lienors, the doctrine of the inchoate and general
lien continued to give the Government the extraordinary status of an unse-
cured creditor capable of superseding prior liens that were not specific and
27 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
28 The history of the transfer of the choateness doctrine from the federal insolvency
priority statute to the tax lien statute is recounted in Kennedy, The Relative Priority of
the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien,
63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954), and updated in Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont:
The Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IowA L. REv.
724 (1965).
29 340 U.S. at 50. The Government suggested additional factors in which the at-
tachment lien should be regarded as contingent or inchoate: (1) the attaching creditor
had no possessory rights in the property; (2) he had no title; (3) he had no priority
over an antedated unrecorded mortgage; (4) his lien terminated if the debtor died
before levy or execution on a judgment; (5) his lien might have been displaced by the
debtor's declaration of homestead before judgment; (6) the attachment lien may have
been discharged by the debtor's giving of security. Brief for Petitioner at 37-38, United
States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950). A comparable list of
persuasive arguments for inferiority of competing liens can be drawn in most cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1945).
30 See United States v. Acri, 209 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1953), affg per curiam 109
F. Supp 943 (N.D. Ohio, 1952) (attachment lien); United States v. Canadian Am.
Co., 108 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (local tax lien).
31 In 1913 Congress passed the first law dealing with the requirement of recordation
of federal tax liens in order to gain priority over competing liens. Act of March 4,
1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016. By this provision the unrecorded federal lien would not
be granted priority over any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser without notice, or judgment
creditor. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Savage, 110 F. Supp. 615 (D. Alas.), rev'd, 228 F.2d
517 (9th Cir. 1953); American Fid. Co. v. Delaney, 114 F. Supp. 702 (D. Vt. 1953).
32 United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).




This preferred status held by the Government inevitably led to uncer-
tainty, confusion, and disruption of modem business transactions, and many
groups, including the American Bar Association, recommended the passage
of an equitable law that would furnish competing lienors some guidelines
explaining the priority of liens and curb the trend toward federal superior-
ity.3 5 After ten years of such effort, Congress passed the Federal Tax Lien
Act of 1966.36 Despite the expectations of many legal scholars and prac-
ticing attorneys that this new Act would clarify the confusion and difficul-
ties in tax lien law which had developed throughout the years,3 7 it has done
little to render the modern businessman more secure in his transac-
tions. Nowhere is this more evident than in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
United States.
Il. TEXAS OIL & GAS CORP. V. UNITED STATES
In Texas Oil & Gas the Government sought to gain priority of its federal
tax lien over the competing lien based upon a security agreement between
the Pecos Bank and the taxpayer. Relying on traditional definitions of choate-
ness and priority, the Fifth Circuit first explored whether the security in-
terest of the bank was perfected under Texas law.38 As a general rule, a
security interest "exists" only to the extent that at the time of the filing of a
federal tax lien the holder has parted with money or money's worth, and
only if the property is "in existence" at such time.39 The written security
agreement which covers subsequent advances or acquisitions must have been
entered into before notice of the federal tax lien filing.40 Also, the security
interest must be protected under local law (by recording, filing, taking
34 United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323 (1966), and
United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963) (lender's lien inchoate);
United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (lien for assignment of
receivables inchoate); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956)
(mechanic's lien was too inchoate and unperfected).
85 See generally STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89th CONG. 2d
SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF H.R. 11256, THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN AcT OF 1966
(Comm. Print 1966).3 6Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719(1), 80 Stat. 1125-47 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 6321 (1970)).
37 The Senate report on the bill explicitly states: "This bill is in part an attempt to
conform the lien provisions of the internal revenue laws to the concepts developed in
this Uniform Commercial Code. It represents an effort to adjust the provisions in the
internal revenue laws relating to the collection of taxes of delinquent persons to the more
recent developments in commercial practice (permitted and protected under state law)
and to deal with a multitude of technical problems which have arisen over the past 50
years." S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
38 Section 6323(c) states that a § 6321 alien "shall not be valid with respect to a
security interest which came into existence after tax lien filing but which . . . is in
qualified property covered by the terms of a written agreement entered into before tax
lien filing and constituting . . . a commercial transactions financing agreement . . . and
is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of tax
lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c).
391d. § 6323(h)(1).
40 There was no dispute, under the facts of this case, that the taxpayer-debtor had
entered into a binding security agreement on Mar. 25, 1967, with the bank. This security




possession, giving notice to the account debtor, or whatever state law re-
quires) against a judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation.41
Under Texas law security interest in after-acquired accounts receivable "is
perfected when it has attached," and the interest attaches automatically
if the lender has taken "all of the applicable steps required for perfec-
tion.' 42  A perfected security interest is protected by Texas law against a
person who does not become a "lien creditor . . before the [security inter-
est] is perfected."'43  A problem arises, in that neither a secured creditor
nor a judgment creditor can attach his lien to the debtor's after-acquired ac-
counts receivable until these accounts come into existence, regardless of
whether he has taken all the necessary steps for perfection of such lien.
Thus, the court, in construing these sections of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code, determined that the bank's interest was not protected by local
law. The court stated:
[I]t is unlikely under Texas law that the money owed to taxpayer-
debtor by Texas Oil & Gas could be considered 'acquired' accounts
or accounts receivable at the time of the filing of the tax lien... .
for prior to that date taxpayer-debtor had neither entered into a con-
tract with Texas Oil & Gas nor rendered services. 44
The services by the taxpayer-debtor upon which the accounts receivable were
based could not be considered a contract right at the time of the filing of
the tax lien, for there was no existing contract between Texas Oil and Gas
and the taxpayer at that time.45
The court indicated its unwillingness to allow a taxpayer-debtor to lock
in his property for an indefinite period of time through the means of a secur-
ity agreement, by interpreting Texas law as requiring that the secured prop-
erty be fully acquired before the private competing lien may be deemed
choate. The court concluded that, at most, the bank possessed under state
41 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(c)(1), (d). The requirement of perfection as
against judgment lien creditors is also imposed on security interests covering loans al-
ready advanced. Id. § 6323(h)(1)(A).
42 Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.303 (1968). A security interest in chattel
paper or negotiable instruments is perfected by filing while all other instruments can be
perfected only by the secured party's taking possession. Id. § 9.304(a). This is sub-ject to the exception that security interest in instruments or negotiable documents are
perfected without filing or the taking of possession for a period of 21 days from the
time the interest attaches, to the extent that it arises for new value given under a
written security agreement. Id. § 9.304(d). After 21 days the interest must be fully
perfected by filing or taking possession or such interest lapses. Id. § 9.304(f).
43 Id. § 9.301(a)(2). The judgment lien, as a standard against which a security
interest competing with a federal tax lien is measured by § 6323, is analogous to a
"judgment lien creditor" if the judgment holder has actually acquired a lien under ap-
plicable state law. "A 'lien creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy, or the like . . . ." Id. § 9.301(c). The Texas
version of the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly provides that "the debtor has no
rights . . . in an account until it comes into existence." Id. § 9.204(b).
44 466 F.2d at 1050.
45 See TEx. Bus. & Comvi. CODE ANN. §§ 9.106, 9.204(a) (1968). Section 9.106
defines "account," "contract right," and "general intangible;" "contract right" is defined
as "any right to payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not
evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper." Section 9.204 states that a "security
interest cannot attach until there is agreement . . . that it attach and value is given and
the debtor has rights in the collateral."
1973]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
law a mere "general intangible" with regards to the prospective accounts
receivable, and the tax lien statutes in question expressly exclude general
intangibles from protection against competing federal tax liens. 4" Thus,
the bank lost its argument concerning state law, for Texas law would not
render the bank's interest in the accounts receivable sufficiently choate when
in competition with federal tax liens. This does not mean that the bank's
security was not sufficiently perfected under state law, nor imply that other
action was required by the bank to maintain its interest in future accounts
receivable. The accounts had not come into existence at the required point
in time, and, therefore, the identity and the amount of the accounts were
unknown.
47
Despite its inferior position under state law, the bank's argument, based
on the explicit language of section 6323(c), was that its security agreement
represented one of the limited exceptions to the "choateness" doctrine. Un-
der this section, such a security agreement "shall be treated as coming
within the term [commercial financing agreement] only to the extent that
such loan or purchase is made before the 46th day after the date of the tax
lien filing, or. . . before the lender or purchaser had actual notice or knowl-
edge of such tax lien filing."'48  Based on this language, the bank contended
that it could maintain priority for property acquired by the taxpayer-debtor
after the filing of the tax lien, but pursuant to loans actually advanced prior
to or within forty-five days of filing. This argument would permit the
lender to claim collateral for which it has actually disbursed funds within
the forty-five day period, although such collateral would come into existence
at some future date.
The court rejected this contention, stating that "Congress contemplated
not only that the funds must actually be advanced prior to or within the 45
days of the filing of the tax lien, but also that the secured property must be
46 See INT. Rev. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c) (2) (B).
47 The court could have stopped its analysis at this point, with sufficient basis on
which to declare the competing lien inferior. The general principle in tax lien litigation
has always been that, although a federal court has the power and right to examine and
redetermine a state court's conclusion that a particular competing lien was not totally
perfected, that determination would be "practically conclusive." United States v. Se-
curity Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1950); Illinois ex. rel. Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 371 (1946).
48 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c) (emphasis added). Where new disburse-
ments, pursuant to a factoring agreement, contemporaneously bring in collateral to
secure them, even though a tax lien had been previously filed, case law gives the party
secured by a purchase money agreement a prior interest in the collateral for the
amount of his disbursement. See Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115
(10th Cir. 1961); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wall, 239 F. Supp. 433
(W.D.N.C. 1965); United States v. Lebanon Woollen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp.
393 (D.N.H. 1964). However, if the lender must make advances after the filing of
a tax lien which do not result in his obtaining new collateral, the lender may find that
he is only fattening the federal tax lien at his expense. Subsection (d) of § 6323 protects
post-filing advances for a maximum of 45 days or any shorter period until the time
that actual notice or knowledge of the filing (not of the existence of the lien) comes
to the lender's attention. Advances during that period will take priority over the filed
lien if (1) the new advance is made pursuant to a prior-in-time security agreement,
(2) the new advance is secured only by property owned by the taxpayer at the date
of the tax lien filing, and (3) the new security interest arising with respect to the
post-tax-lien-filing advance is protected against a judgment lien arising, as of the
tipie of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation..
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'acquired' within that period. '49 Although it was not clear from the record
whether the Pecos Bank had advanced funds to the taxpayer within the
forty-five day grace period, it was undisputed that none of the accounts re-
ceivable had come into existence during that time. The only alternative
was for the bank to argue that its security interest was actually "acquired"
when the loan agreement with the taxpayer originated. This position was
based on the contention that at the time of the tax lien filing, the taxpayer
had "established" rights in the collateral at the present, even though the
security interest might exist only in the future. This argument was exactly
contrary to the traditional aspects of the choateness doctrine, which required
the collateral to be fixed beyond change as to both amount and identity.
Despite the bank's arguments to the contrary, the court declared that this
longstanding doctrine remains unchanged and controlling under the 1966
Act.50
The use of the choateness test by the court to evaluate the position of the
competing liens is distressing in light of prior uncertainties generated by this
doctrine, and the remedial intent of the tax lien amendments enacted by
Congress in 1966. It seemed that the true legislative intent was to test
consensual security agreements by the standards enunciated in sections
6323(c) 51 and 6323(h).5 2 The court, in its rejection of the bank's argu-
ment for priority under Texas and federal law, relied upon the traditional
application of choateness, while totally disregarding the legislative man-
dates evidenced in these two sections. 53 Similar results could have been
reached in this context by directly applying the "property in existence"
test of section 6323(h)(1). 54  Undoubtedly, this section was specifically
designed to avoid the uncertainties of the choateness doctrine while dealing
with the attempts by taxpayers to encumber their future property so as to
defeat any future tax liability.65 Thus the court, in ignoring the standards
as modified by Congress, rejuvenated the uncertain and ill-defined doctrine
of choateness, a result not desired by the drafters of the 1966 Act.
49466 F.2d at 1049; see INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(2)(B); S. REP. No.
1708, supra note 37, at 8.
50 466 F.2d at 1053.
51 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(1).
52 For purposes of this section . . . (1) The term 'security interest' means
any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of securing
payment or performance of an obligation or indemnifying against loss
or liability. A security interest exists at any time (A) if, at such time,
the property is in existence and the interest has become protected under
local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured
obligation, and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder has
parted with money or money's worth.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(1).
53 466 F.2d at 1052.
54 It should be noted that the "property in existence" test of § 6323(h) (1) is very
similar in intent and effect as the test of whether the property may be definitely
identified under the choateness test. Similarly, the provision in § 6323(c)(1), that a
security interest exist only to the extent of value given, mirrors the requirement of
choateness that the amount of the lien be established. The major difference between
these subsections and their corresponding parts of the choateness test would seem to be
the uncertainty that naturally accompanies the use of such a judicially-originated
standard. The standards of § 6323 are more clearly defined and easily adaptable to
commercial financing arrangements.
55 See note 37 supra.
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In not specifically dealing with sections 6323(c) and (h), the court im-
plied that the choateness doctrine and the dictates of these subsections are
parallel and homogeneous. This implication could lead to both disastrous
and inconsistent results as future courts attempt to apply the standards of
section 6323. Congress has allowed a security interest to attain priority if
the contract rights are fully acquired within forty-five days after the tax
lien's filing and these rights are security for prior loans from a financier
without knowledge of the tax lien's filing. By retention of the choateness
test, such a security interest could be deemed inferior in spite of the specific
forty-five-day priority period, in that the identity and amount of the prop-
erty arising within this grace period could be unknown at the time of filing
the tax lien, and thus inchoate with a consequent priority of the tax lien.
In employing this doctrine in Texas Oil & Gas the court again relegated se-
curity interests to their pre-1966 position of inferiority under all circum-
stances.
Having lost under the 1966 Act and on choateness, the bank advanced
a novel argument for parity with the federal tax lien by arguing the appli-
cability of a different law. The bank contended that the federal tax lien
attached only at the same time its lien attached, at the time the accounts re-
ceivable came into existence. Thus, since the federal lien was not prior in
time and the bank only sought parity with the federal lien and not su-
periority, it asserted that its interest did not fall within the scope of the tax
lien amendments nor within the confines of the choateness doctrine. The
court rejected this argument as being contrary to both the history and the
express language of the Tax Lien Act of 1966,11 which provides for imme-
diate inferiority for the competing lien when neither the loan nor the se-
curity existed under federal law prior to the forty-sixth day after the filing
of the federal tax lien. Thus, even though the Government, as well as the
bank, could not claim an immediate, enforceable interest in the taxpayer's
property until the accounts receivable actually had come into existence, it
held an enforceable superior lien upon the accounts receiveable. 57  At-
tempted perfection of the state and federal lien by the bank was irrelevant,
for the priority of each lien under these circumstances must depend on the
point in time at which it attached to the property and became choate.58
In answering this argument for parity, the court again relied needlessly
upon the choateness doctrine. Since the identity and amount of the future
accounts receivable were unknown when the notice of the tax lien was filed,
this security interest was inchoate under the traditional standards and, there-
56 Judge Goldberg rejected the inference of equality between competing tax liens by
stating, "Section 6323 certainly was not enacted to decide dead heats among racing
lienholders." 466 F.2d at 1052. See Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien
Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81
HARM. L. REV. 1369 (1968); Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the
Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228 (1967).
57 The court feared that if the bank's theory were accepted, "lien documents of
ancient lineage without any actual debtor relationship or physical security would be
subject to rejuvenation at any time and for all time." 466 F.2d at 1051.
58 See United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954). For the private
competing lien holder, the security interest must both attach and be perfected under
state law and be choate under federal law.
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fore, immediately subordinate to the federal lien.59 The court refused to
answer fully the lingering objections that perfection and priority of security
interests were not intended to be determined by the application of the doc-
trine. Indeed this parity argument could have been answered by the court
by relying directly upon the language of section 6323(c).60 Nowhere in
the dictates of the statute or in its legislative history is mention made of a
further exception to the congressional scheme of immediate subordination
of competing liens. Thus, it seems implicit that Congress would not, in
drafting the tax lien amendments for the express purpose of defining the
uncertainties of prior tax lien legislation, leave to be implied a system of
parity that was intended to supplement the limited exception to federal pri-
ority explicitly stated in section 6323(c). As noted earlier, the court, in
its misplaced reliance, actually reintroduced uncertainty and possible conflict
with the definitive statements promulgated by Congress.61 In short, though
the conclusion that the Government held an enforceable lien on the tax-
payer's accounts receivable is justified by the facts of this case, the rationale
employed by the court can only serve to revive prior uncertainties and to
confuse the congressional attempt at clarification of the relation between
consensual security interests and federal tax liens.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of the choateness doctrine, coupled with the dictates of section
6323, offer the commercial lender little hope of priority when competing
against federal tax liens. The forty-five-day grace period, the major pro-
tection offered to commercial lenders, at best excuses daily checks on the
tax filing. Even this, however, has been shown to be a nominal advantage,
for the lender would not likely have the entire forty-five-day period in
which to act. Even if he discovered the lien immediately after it is filed,
there is little that the lender can do to protect his advances, for he has no
control over the actual receipt of after-acquired property by the taxpayer-
debtor. The most important aspect of Texas Oil & Gas is the clear showing
of need for Congress or the Supreme Court to clarify the interrelation be-
tween security lending transactions and federal tax liens. Unless this clari-
fication is forthcoming, the businessman and lawyer will have to live with
the fear that similar security transactions perfected and planned to comply
with tax lien statutes will be defeated by the vague and ambiguous choate-
ness test as promulgated by the federal courts.
Ronald G. Williams
59 466 F.2d at 1052.6
o INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c).
61 See note 54 supra, and accompanying text.
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